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Abstract:
The purpose is to discuss some of the results and problems presented by the study of the topics
between Aristotle's work and the treatment of them by Perelman and his followers. For instance,
the method whereby classical and modern rhetorical theorists connect figurative language with
techniques of persuasion, consists in proposing that there exists a restricted number of "universal"
argumentative strategies. Until the Renaissance, text producers and receivers shared a common
knowledge of such argumentative procedures. In the twentieth century, Perelman and others have
re-conceived the topics making up the "New Rhetoric's" argumentative function, as comparison of
the two systems reveals.
***
Begin with a story. Make it autobiographical, incorporate the topic of modesty and we have the beginnings of a
captatio. As procatalepsis, however, I warn you that mine may prove a cautionary tale.
Once upon a time a young scholar looking for truth fell by mischance into literary criticism. Seeking certainty, or
at least a method having more than traditional usage to recommend it, he decided to examine the mechanisms of
literary language to see what results they might yield. Searching for methodological tools, he apprenticed himself
to a magician who promised that in Stylistics lay the way. Discovering, however, that evaluation of linguistic
ornamentation did not offer the answers he needed, he looked around again. In a dark wood, he fell in with a
band of jugglers, who called themselves Structuralists and who declared that certainty lay in the reduction of
complex problems to binary oppositions and to a few primary forms from which all others would certainly be
deduced, when they could find the time to publish their final results. Always hopeful, he launched into the theories
of genre and narrative they espoused, learning much, but usually disappointed by the disproportion between the
complicated nature of the theory adumbrated and the fairly simple character of the results achieved from its
application to specific texts. (One of the things he had learned by this time was, by the way, that at a time of
reducing University enrolments in the Arts, it was not wise to declare that the texts he was working on were
indeed "literary". That adjective tended to be replaced by the epithet, "useless", by administrators or, indeed, by
anyone else who had suffered from a "literary" education.)
Tired and blasé by now, he came across ancient rhetoric, which looked promising and he was preparing to
investigate it more closely, when he attended one of those colloquia which form the jousting—places at which the
champions of the various literary methods or theories display their prowess. There he was accosted and
promised logical rigour by a semiotician, who rubbished rhetoric as merely literary criticism under another name,
adding that, anyway, its jargon was impossible. The semiotician declared that in the examination of the dance of
the bees, or in close attention to the mating practices of spiders, or, even, in the vestimentary sign-systems of
humans resides the most scientific way of preparing oneself to analyse literature. It was simply a matter, the sign-

master said, of creating a rigorous logic of actantial configuration, a logical square of semantic oppositions, and of
building a meta-linguistic bathyscape capable of descending to the appropriate "level" of signification. Once these
minor task were accomplished, or even before, the happy few would achieve incontrovertible results. Worried a
little by the semiotician's confidence and obvious reluctance to enter into debate about the metaphors he was
using, the by now not-so-young scholar was finally disconcerted when he found the scientific investigators he so
respected carving up conventional disciplines prior to colonising them. In his own case, however, being neither a
cultural nationalist nor a propagandist for post-modernity or post-colonialism, he left them to it. As it happened,
he had discovered at long last what it was that interested him and what it was he wanted to investigate.
In his first slight contacts with rhetoric, he had confused it with stylistics, because what passed for rhetoric in the
post-Romantic age in which he lived was what the Classical, medieval, and non-Ramist Renaissance rhetors had
called the elocutio, the theoretical taxonomy of tropes and figures. Always more interested in the means by
which texts communicate what used to be called "ideas", or intellectual concepts, he discovered, only at this late
date that, in fact, rhetoric's primary purpose was to persuade, rather than simply to move or delight. He
discovered this fact in a curious way, one which illustrates perfectly the ancient maxim, "When all else fails, read
the instructions". What he did, was to read the Rhetoric of Aristotle, which, in comparison with the theories of
discourse production and reception to which he had been exposed up to that point, seemed to offer the
authority, verifiability and persuasiveness that he had been seeking. He was determined, however, not to slide
back into the study only of the tropes and figures, so he gave special attention to the argumentative forms called
topics. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss some of the results and problems presented by the study of the
topics between Aristotle's eight books on the subject and the discussion of them in the twentieth century by
Chaim Perelman and his followers. Such an ambitious project will necessarily involve a degree of schematisation
and over-simplification for which I apologize in advance.
Since my first problem concerns the meaning of the word "Topic", I will need to foreground the topic of
etymology. As a non-reader of Greek, I must rely, for the material on which to base my own arguments, upon
translations into English, French or à la rigueur, Latin, of the primary texts. I am not alone in this, I realise, but it
does cause certain problems. We are all familiar, I'm sure, with the meaning of the Greek word, topoï, which the
Oxford English Dictionary, not usually a very reliable source for the definition of rhetorical terms, defines by
reference to the, I quote: "title of a work by Aristotle, lit[erally]. matters concerning commonplaces". C.C.J.
Webb, author of the OED's entry on "topic", goes on:
The use of "topos" for a class of considerations which would serve as a place in which a rhetorician
might look for suggestions in treating his theme goes back to Isocrates. By Aristotle topos was
generally appropriated to classes of considerations of a general character, common to many kinds
of subjects, the use of which was open to anyone dealing with his subject as a rhetorician or
dialectician, not with scientific knowledge with a view to scientific demonstration. Such were more
fully described as kolnoi topoï, loci communes, commonplaces. Aristotle's treatise on probable
(as distinguished from demonstrative) reasoning, which started from such general considerations
and dispensed with special knowledge, was referred to as ta topika; and such general
considerations and arguments based thereon as were treated of in that work were called topic
axioms, topic arguments, or simply topics; sometimes with more, sometimes with less emphasis
on the general character of such arguments.1
So far so bad, then. Does the confusion, that I read in the definition just quoted come down to this? Topics, to
which Aristotle devoted the eight books already mentioned, are more general than topoï, of which he lists

twenty-eight in chapter 23 of Rhetoric II? Richard Lanham seems to think so:
The commonplace, [he writes], is the general term for, or at least overlaps the device Aristotle
defined more narrowly, and placed specifically in the definition of Invention [...]. Thus, loci,
properly speaking, has two overlapping meanings: commonplace observations, and common
sources of arguments. Collections of rhetorical commonplaces, of whatever sort, have always been
surveys, as Kenneth Burke writes in blending the two meanings, "of the things that people generally
consider persuasive, and of methods that have persuasive effects" (Rhetoric of Motives, p. 580). 2
Comparison of the Aristotelian list of the Categories with that of the Topics establishes various similarities,
dissimilarities, and anomalies. The ten "categories of predication", as listed by Aristotle are: "What a thing is,
Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity, Passivity."3 Whereas, the general topics of the
Inventio include: definition, division, similitude, dissimilitude, adjuncts, cause, effect, etymology, inflexions, etc.
No wonder Trebathius, Cicero's lawyer-friend, had difficulty grasping the subleties of the topics. He asked
Cicero for an explanation and it is to Cicero's list of 17 topics that modern commentators usually turn when
considering the topics of argumentation. I shall return to Cicero' 16 topics intrinsic to the speech, which subsume
Aristotle's "artificial" proofs, and one extrinsic, or "inartificial" topic, testimony, in a moment. The reason I am
retracing my steps is that I have not yet looked at Aristotle's treatment of topics/or topoï in the Rhetoric itself.
Aristotle's enumeration of twenty-eight lines of argument on which enthymemes, demonstrative and refutative,
can be based occurs in chapter 23 of Rhetoric II, as I've said. The second book is devoted to pragmatic
matters, offering, for example, Aristotle's theory of pathos (emotional appeals, and his advice to rhetors on how
to exploit them before various audiences. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that his twenty-eight valid topics
include specific lines like the following: restatement of a contention in opposite terms; synonymic redefinition;
correlative ideas; a fortiori; argument from past circumstances; accusation turned against the accuser; strategic
definition; wordplay; logical division; induction from parallel cases; argument from authority, from precedent,
from a previous verdict; the contention argued part by part; argument from good, bad, or logical consequences;
concession; causality; the application of an opponent's earlier decision to a later case, to his disadvantage;
argument from possible, general or plausible motive; from "true" improbability; from the opponent's inaccuracies
and self-contradictions; refutation of slander as "mistaken" or "misinformed"; the argument that effect proves
cause and vice versa; argument from "trustful" (i.e., non-adversarial ignorance); from the inconsistency of
asserted action; from previous mistakes which defend, or explain present ones; and onomastic wordplay. The list
displays, despite the incoherencies introduced by abbreviation, both the links it retains to the arguments outlined
in the Topics, and the diversity which indicates that the common places represent, as Lanham puts it, a category
"so large as to prohibit enumeration." 4 This impression is confirmed by chapter 24 of Rhetoric II, in which
Aristotle offers ten invalid topics or fallacies. They include: hasty conclusion, illogical wordplay, overstatement or
hasty generalisation, emotive (e.g. indignant) language, abuse of a single, unrepresentative example, confusion of
accident and essence, argument from false cause, post hoc ergo propter hoc, ignorance of crucial
circumstances, confusion of general and particular, proving the improbable probable, and vice versa. Although
the revelation of the fallacious character of the devices listed is in itself useful, it does not seem to be either
exhaustive or systematic. But such a criticism betrays only, perhaps, the kind of utopian belief in the easily
circumscribed and analysed nature of heterogeneous data characteristic of reductionisms, ancient and modern.
When Cicero responded to Trebathius's request for a gloss on the Aristotelian Topics, he began by explaining as
follows the desirability of enumerating the possible lines of argument. He also explained their methodological

function and defined their pragmatic character:
Every systematic treatment of argumentation has two branches, one concerned with invention of
arguments and the other with judgement of their validity; [...]. A comparison may help: it is easy to
find things that are hidden if the hiding place is pointed out and marked; similarly, if we wish to track
down some argument we ought to know the places or topics: for that is the name given by Aristotle
to the "regions", as it were, from which arguments are drawn. Accordingly, we may define a topic
as the region of an argument, and an argument as a course of reasoning which firmly establishes a
matter about which there is some doubt. 5
Clearly, the theory of argumentative invention here depends upon a systematic mapping of the territory to be
exploited. I am sorry for the metaphor, but, as you can see, this spatial analogy dominates the presentation of
arguments in the Classical period. This has led at various times to discoveries of new or unexplored
argumentative fields. The relationships of such "places" with the known rhetorical "world" have often been treated
as problematic. As has been frequently pointed out in the history of rhetoric, taxonomy is no substitute for theory.
The taxonomical urge in rhetorical argumentation produced its most strikingly diverse results in Renaissance
Europe. We are fortunate in possessing several exhaustive treatments of argumentation as it affected theories of
composition and reception current in, for example, Elizabethan Britain. Indeed, the tradition of non-Ramist
rhetorical analysis which has flourished in Anglo-Saxon countries in the twentieth century owes much to scholars,
American in the main, like William Crane, Allan Gilbert, Rosemond Tuve, T.W. Baldwin, Miriam Joseph and
W.S. Howell. 6 Such scholars retained the Aristotelian view of rhetoric which saw argumentation as central to
persuasion. Whereas Ramus and his followers saw the functions of movere and delectare as sufficient to explain
effects produced by the elocutio, non-Ramist scholars saw in the rhetorical domains of ethos, logos, and
pathos arsenals of devices, both argumentative and tropological or figurative which authors and readers ignored
at their peril.
The always complex and controversial relationships between literary genres, narrative, lyric, dramatic, and
discursive genres, judicial, deliberative, epideictic offered two solutions, depending on the views of rhetoric upon
which they were thought to depend. If rhetoric is merely elocutionary, novels, poems and plays may be thought
to consist merely of tropes and figures. If they are considered to be discourses which make ethical, logical, and
emotional appeals in order to persuade readers or spectators of the ideas, norms or attitudes which they
embody, then analysis of their argumentative techniques is considered not merely desirable, but indispensable.
What the post-Romantic age found controversial in such a theory, naturally, was its application, and I would like
to spend a few moments explaining some of the problems involved in basing a theory of persuasion applicable to
literary texts upon Cicero's 17 topics.
The 17 Ciceronian topics were divided, you will remember, into 16 intrinsic and 1 extrinsic. Cicero recapitulates
his list in the Topics, as follows:
This is the end of the rules for the invention of arguments, so that if you have journeyed through
definition, partition, etymology, conjugates, genus, species, similarity, difference, contraries,
adjuncts, consequents, antecedents, contradictions, causes, effects, and comparison of things
greater, less and equal, no region of [intrinsic] arguments remains to be explored. [... The extrinsic]
form of argumentation, that is said not to be subject to the rules of art, depends on testimony. For
our present purpose we define testimony as everything that is brought in from some external
circumstance in order to win conviction. 7

The general theory of composition and reading which Tudor logicians and rhetors like Thomas Blundeville, Angel
Day, Dudley Fenner, Abraham Fraunce, John Hoskyns, Ralph Lever, Henry Peacham, George Puttenham,
Richard Sherry, Thomas Wilson and others derived from the Ciceronian topics is outlined in, among other
works, Miriam Joseph's account of the theory and its accompanying application to the plays of Shakespeare. Let
me give a few examples of literary argumentation in order to document my contention that an understanding of
the close links between Aristotelian dialectic and rhetorical figures makes possible a general theory of
composition and reception. I will take my examples from Shakespeare and Victor Hugo.
The topic of logical definition, for example, lends itself to rhetorical, strategic or prescriptive manipulation. In
addition, the figure of systrophe piles together many definitions of one thing. So Macbeth employs systrophe to
define sleep:
Sleep that knits up the ravell'd sleave of care.
The death of each day's life, sore labour's bath,
Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course,
Chief nourisher in life's feast. (2.2.37)
And the narrator of Les Misérables echoes Marius's prejudices against convicts in the following prescriptive
definition:
[...] c'était un forçat; c'est-à-dire l'être qui, dans l'échelle sociale, n'a même pas de place, étant audessous du dernier échelon. Après le dernier des hommes vient le forçat. Le forçat n'est plus, pour
ainsi dire, le semblable des vivants. La loi l'a destitué de toute la quantité d'humanité qu'elle peut
ôter à un homme. 8
Division is the source of several figures including synecdoche, merismus, enumeration, epigrammatic summary
and disjunctive propositions like, for instance, that of Antony: "These strong Egyptian fetters must I break/Or
lose myself in dotage" (Anthony & Cleopatra, 1.2.120).
The topic separating subject and adjuncts, a person and his or her clothing, for instance, produces both plot
devices and figures of amplification. The latter may detail circumstances, or distribute to each subject the adjunct
which a given intepretative community believes appropriate. It is also the source of encomion, as when Hamlet
exclaims, "What a piece of work is a man!" (2.2.315), before going on to list human characteristics he believes
admirable. Antonomasia and periphrasis substitute a common noun for a proper name or an adjunct for a
subject. In Notre-Dame de Paris, for example, the narrator substitutes the expressions <<notre philosophe>>,
<<le sourd>>, and <<l'homme noir>> to désignate respectively Pierre Gringoire, Quasimodo, and Claude
Frollo. 9
Contraries and contradictories produce conflict and dramatic foils. Again Hamlet:
I'll be your foil, Laertes. In mine ignorance
Your skill shall, like a star i' the darkest night
Stick fiery off indeed. (5.2.226)
Victor Hugo's well-known fondness for antithesis exploits this topic. In Han d'Islande, for example, the hero,
Ordener, declares his passion thus to Éthel: <<J'irai avec joie à l'échafaud pour toi; j'irais avec horreur à l'autel
pour toute autre femme>>10 . Litotes, by which a speaker denies the subject's contrary or contradictory, figures

this topic too. Gloucester, for instance, in King Lear, says of Edgar: "Let him fly far, Not in this land shall he
remain uncaught" (2.1.58).
The topic of analogy, source of figures of similitude and comparison like metaphor, simile, parable, fable, and so
on produces arguments frequently more striking than persuasive. Sebastian says of Gonzalo in The Tempest:
"Look, he's winding up the watch of his wit; by and by it will strike" (2.1.12). And the narrator of Les
Misérables says of Gavroche, the street-urchin: <<Paris a un enfant et la forêt a un oiseau; l'oiseau s'appelle le
moineau; l'enfant s'appelle le gamin>>11 .
Arguments from the greater, the equal, and the less produce rhetorical figures of exaggeration and extenuation,
and effects like climax and bathos, hyperbole and meiosis. Coriolanus uses the latter in dismissing the citizens:
"Go get you home, you fragments!" (Cor. 1.1.226).
Cause and effect produce many literary arguments. The Renaissance logicians mention four principal causes: the
efficient, material, formal, and final. All four are evident in the following enumeration of the tools used by Gilliatt in
Les Travailleurs de la mer to salvage the engine of the wrecked ship, la Durande:
Il avait pour combustible l'épave, l'eau pour moteur, le vent pour souffleur, une pierre pour
enclume, pour art son instinct, pour puissance sa volonté. 12
Metalepsis attributes to a present effect a remote cause. Thus Hamlet:
To what base uses we may return, Horatio! Why may not imagination trace the noble dust of
Alexander till he find it stopping a bunghole? [...] Alexander died, Alexander was buried, Alexander
returneth into dust; the dust is earth; of earth we make loam; and why of that loam (whereto he was
converted) might they not stop a beer barrel?" (5.1.223-35).
Argument from conjugates, that is, from words having the same derivation, involves polyptoton, puns, syllepsis
and so on. The argumentative function of polyptotes can be seen clearly in its following axiomatic usage in Hugo's
l'Homme qui rit: "Se sentant innocent, il [Gwynplaine] consentait. Pas une plainte. L'irréprochable ne reproche
pas." 13 Etymology, another aspect of the argument from names produces results both scientific and popular.
Pericles addresses his daughter thus, for example: "My gentle Marina-whom/For she was born at sea, I have
named so-" (3.3.12). But the best-known of such arguments is Juliet's remark to Romeo:
Tis but thy name that is my enemy. [...]
O be some other name!
What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet. (Romeo & Juliet, 2.2.38-44)
Captious arguments depending upon paronomasia and antanaclasis abound in literary texts, as you are well
aware.
These few examples will, I hope, have shown that the theory of composition and reception explained by the
Tudor logicians and rhetors asserts the logical links between argumentation and ornamentation. Rosemund Tuve
explains and justifies the theory as follows, finding in it a theoretical paradigm opposed to Romantic theories of
pure inspiration or to the Surrealist cult of the unconscious in art.
In drawing a relation between Invention in logic and the process of poetic invention which produced

(among other things) images, I do not wish to imply that there was no difference between the two
or that the Elizabethans thought there was none. [...] What happens rather is that writers trained for
years in finding matter for persuasive, demonstrative, expository, or disputative discourse, by the
means of playing the mind down certain prescribed paths, do not forget this useful process when
they turn to the "finding" of ways to shape poetic subjects.
Invention, the finding or figuring out of what one was going to say of a subject, was one of the two
divisions treated in both logic and rhetoric (Inventio, Dispositio). [...] Invention was no slave's
labour. In both logic and rhetoric this division of Inventio was that in which the faculty of
imagination was thought to be most active. 14
So the sixteenth century possessed a coherent theory of logic and poetics. So what? you ask. Things have
changed and writers in many cases are no longer "trained for years in finding matter for persuasive,
demonstrative, expository, or disputative discourse". Do they still produce arguments instinctively, without, as it
were, prior knowledge of the Inventio? The answers to this question form the final section of my paper.
The first of these would simply point to the extremely elaborate character of the Renaissance theory of
argumentative poetics from which an equally elaborate poetic practice followed. Anyone who has attended a
Shakespeare play will vouch for the complications of the language used. Perhaps modern authors and readers do
have a less extensive knowledge of and a less intensive exposure to argumentation, but that is not to say,
however, that they have abandoned argumentation. To support my thesis, I need only adapt Dumarsais's remark
concerning the tropes to include argumentation.
J'ai pris souvent plaisir, [...], à entendre des paysans s'entretenir avec des figures de discours si
variées, si vives, si éloignées du vulgaire, que j'avais honte d'avoir pendant si longtemps étudié
l'éloquence, puisque je voyais en eux une certaine rhétorique de nature beaucoup plus persuasive et
plus éloquente que toutes nos rhétoriques artificielles. En effet, je suis persuadé qu'il se fait plus de
figures en un seul jour de marché à la halle, qu'il ne s'en fait en plusieurs jours d'assemblées
académiques. 15
If figures were appropriate to publicise the merchandise, certainly arguments were necessary to establish
agreement on price.
In opposition to this pro-instinctive view of rhetorical discourse is the interest in the academic study of
argumentation to which colloquia like this one testify. That the argumentative aspect of the reception of literary
texts still possesses qualified practitioners should not be doubted. The academic critic certainly is nowadays
"trained for years in finding matter for persuasive, demonstrative, expository, or disputative discourse". The effect
of this training has been to produce, among similar results in other disciplines, the renewal of interest in
argumentation both in literary and non-literary texts with which we are all familiar.
I will say little about another post-Renaissance development in the study of argumentation, because, in such a
colloquium as this, the topic has no doubt been treated by specialists in the subject. I refer to the considerable
development of the Ciceronian topic of testimony which, in the 17th century, became one of the bases of the
Cartesian scientific method. Evidence, data, the experimental method, statistics, all of these empirical proofs,
proclaiming themselves extrinsic to the discourse, parade their apparent independence of argumentation. Except,
that is, in the exordium and peroration of such discourses.

Any survey of the study of argumentation which claims to refer to the twentieth century must include a
consideration of Perelman's work. What does he have to say about the topics? In his Traité de
l'argumentation, in which he offers a "new rhetoric of value judgements", Perelman begins his treatment of the
Topics by repeating the distinction Aristotle made between demonstration and dialectic, between "scientific"
deduction based on "true" premises and argumentation dependent upon the verisimilitude deriving from an appeal
to opinions held by the public addressed. However, as he says, Perelman preferred to study rhetorical
argumentation rather than scientific demonstration, because: <<c'est en fonction d'un auditoire que se
développe toute argumentation>>16 . This crucial statement, which replaces demonstration within an
epistemology of the probable-because-previously-accepted, reveals the secondary character of the so-called
"extrinsic" proof. Although extrinsic to the particular discourse under way, the axioms underlying demonstration
take their authority from the body of precedents serving as presuppositions to the discourse of any interpretative
community, be it scientific or not. This at any rate is how I read the following statement by Perelman concerning
the commonality of topic-axioms in rhetoric and dialectic: (p. 62).
One may wonder whether the existence among Aristotle's works of two treatises devoted to
argumentation, the Topics and the Rhetoric, the one referring to the theoretical discussion of
theses, the other taking account of particular audiences, has not favoured the traditional distinction
between [discourses] which act upon the understanding and those which act upon the will. We
believe that the distinction, which presents the former [type of discourse] as being entirely
impersonal and atemporal, and the second as being wholly irrational, is founded upon error and
leads to an impasse, The error consists in seeing mankind as constituted of faculties completely
separate the one from the other. The impasse consists in removing from action founded upon choice
any rational justification, and so to render absurd the exercise of human freedom of choice. 17
Perelman's taxonomy of Topics appears, at first glance, to have reduced Cicero's 17 to 6:
[...] we will call topics only premisses of a general nature which allow the foundation of values and
hierarchies and which Aristotle studies under the topic of accident. These topics constitute the most
general, often underlying premisses which intervene to justify the greater part of the choices we
make. 18
He goes on to say, like Lanham, that an exhaustive enumeration of topics would not usefully aid a general
understanding of argumentation. However, the universal audience will, he believes respond to the 6 topics he
presents:
What interests us is the means by which all audiences, of whatever nature, are led to take account
of places, which we group under a few generals headings: topics of quantity, quality, order, existent,
essence, person. 19
He then defines the six topics in the order listed.
The topic of quantity is understood to be constituted of those "common places which assert that something is of
greater value than something else for reasons of quantity". He adds that "most frequently, the topic of quantity
constitutes a major premise which is understood but not stated." 20 In contrast, Perelman states, the "topoï of
quality appear in argumentation and are the most clearly apprehended, when the virtue of number is contested."
21 Topoï of order assert the superiority of anterior over posterior, as in the case of "cause, principles, and aim or
purpose"22 over effect, fact, or result. Topoï of the existent assert the superiority of what exists, or is real, over

what is possible, or impossible. As to the topoï of essence, Perelman, writing at a period in which Existentialism
had foregrounded axioms relating to essence and existence, begins by a negative definition in order to distinguish
his axiom from those current in other contemporary discourses.
We understand by the topic of essence, not the metaphysical attitude which would assert the
superiority of an essence over each of its manifestations [<<incarnations>>]—and which is based
on a topos of order—but the fact of according superior value to individuals as characteristic
representatives of the essence in question. It consists in making a comparison between concrete
individuals: thus we straight away attribute value to a rabbit which presents all of a rabbit's qualities;
such a one will be, in our eyes a "fine rabbit." 23
Finally, the topoï derived from the value of a person are, according to Pereleman, "bound to his dignity, merit
[and] autonomy." 24 He adds that these six topics "could be completed by others whose meaning is more
limited." 25
Even a superficial examination like this one reveals the relationships between the topics of Aristotle, Cicero and
Perelman. Let me just add, in closing, a word on another Perelmanian taxonomy, that of the "argumentative
techniques" which he presented in 1977 in L'Empire rhétorique. In that work, he offered, as he says, three
kinds of liaison which "make possible the transference onto the conclusion of the acceptance accorded [by the
audience] to the premisses"26 of a process of argumentation. The three types are: firstly, quasi-logical arguments,
second, those "based on the structure of the real", and third, "those on which this structure is based". Quasilogical arguments are "those understood by confronting them with formal reasoning, mathematical or scientific in
character."27 However, he adds the following corollary: "But a quasi-logical argument differs from a formal
deduction because of the fact that it always presupposes an approval of theses of a non-formal nature, which
alone make possible the application of the argument in question."28 Significantly, as an example of a quasi-logical
argument, Perelman cites the argument from division, one of the Ciceronian topics.
Arguments based on the structure of the real exploit "the liaisons existing between elements of the real." 29
Among such arguments, he cites causality, which combines the Ciceronian topics of cause and effect. Finally, he
defines arguments serving to found "the structure of reality". They are "those which, from a particular known case
allow the establishment of a precedent, a model, or a general rule, such arguments include the model and the
example." 30 Quite clearly, this "category"31 corresponds to Aristotle's topic of analogy, just as it seems to me
the argumentative technique which Perelman names "dissociation" includes the topic of dissimilitude or contraries
and contradictories.
<<Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose>>? Perhaps. If we reject the notion of evolution in the history of
literature, as we most certainly do, we may equally well do so in the history of thought, or more specifically,
argumentation. In my view, at least, the history of the topics from Aristotle to Perelman possesses a sufficient
number of constants to justify my applying to the analysis of literary texts the set of topics, dialectical, quasilogical and rhetorical which further systematization ought better to clarify.
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